Special Lecture 2022

 SGU/CEFM Specilal Lectures 

Advanced Experimental Economics

We will offer TGU/CEFM Special lecture of Experimental Economics for graduate students by Prof. Charles Noussair, who is a CEFM member in America. 
This lecture is only for Wasweda graduate students. 

[Title]:  Advanced Experimental Economics 

[Lecturer]: Charles Noussair ( University of Arizona)

[Date]:  Every Tuesday and Friday on or after 4 Jun, 15 classes

[Abstract]: Experiments are used in economics, like they are in the natural sciences and in psychology, to learn about the world around us. In the case of experimental economics, the goal is to better understand how people make decisions in economic settings and how these translate into overall market and group outcomes. The objectives of this course are to acquaint you with the main findings from economic experiments and give you experience participating in experiments. Depending on the COVID-19 situation, the lectures might be given online. 


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Game Theory and its Application to Political Economy

We will offer TGU/CEFM Special lecture  for graduate students by Prof. Yukio Koriyama, who is a CEFM member in France. 
This lecture is only for Wasweda graduate students. 

[Title]:Market and Institutional Design

[Lecturer]:Yukio Koriyama(Ecole polytechnique)

[Date]:Every Wednesday on or after 4 Jun, 15 classes

[Abstract]:In this course, we study design problems. We study key concepts that are useful in discussing how to design economic and political allocation systems that possess desirable properties, such as efficiency, stability, equality, fairness, and/or strategyproofness. We focus on the aspect of collective decision making, and thus study the normative and strategic properties of an institution as a device of social decision making. We learn about institutional design problems in both public decisions and market allocations. We consider three areas in which traditional markets with the price system would not function properly, or even exist: (i) political decisions, (ii) matching, and (iii) auctions. In each area, we study theoretical results as well as a variety of applications so that students become familiar with both the theoretical concepts useful for analyzing market and institutional design problems, and the practical solutions of economic and political allocation problems.