【schedule】
We are pleased to announce a workshop.
We look forward to your participation.
[Date]：22(Fri.) November, 2024 17:00-18:30
[Place]Room 909 of Building 3 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
[Language]：English
[Speaker]：Marc Willinger (University of Montpellier)
[Title]："Efficiency of the Minimum Approval Mechanism with heterogeneous players"
[Abstract]：We explore, theoretically and experimentally, how endowment inequalities affect the effectiveness of the Minimal Approval Mechanism (MAM) at improving the level of provision of a public good. We find that the mechanism is still Pareto-improving under endowment heterogeneity, but that its efficiency diminishes as inequality is increased. Our experimental findings indicate a significant weakening of the mechanism under endowment inequalities, surpassing our theoretical predictions. A close examination of individual behaviors reveals a significant drop in contributions compared to the uniform case, prompted by even minor inequalities. Intriguingly, our findings challenge conventional assumptions by showing that inequality aversion drives contributions in a public good game with endowment disparities only under certain assumptions. We explore the impact of beliefs about the contributions of advantaged player as potential motivations through guilt aversion and Kantian preferences.
We are pleased to announce a workshop.
We look forward to your participation.
[Date] ：18(Fri.) October, 2024 13:30-14:45
[Place]：Room 310 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)
[Speaker]：John Duffy (University of California)
[Title]："Selection Pressure in Repeated Contests"
[Language]：English
[Application]：No advance registration is required. Please come directly to the Place.
【Past Workshops】
We look forward to your participation.
[Date] ：28(Fri.) June, 2024 17:00-18:30
[Place]：Room 201 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)
[Speaker]：Jean-Robert Tyran (Professor of Economics, University of Vienna)
[Title]：Why votes are (not) for sale - Empirical evidence from Southern India
[Abstract]：India is the world’s largest democracy. One of the reasons why it is considered a “flawed” democracy is that elections are often manipulated by political candidates paying “cash for votes” (C4V). My talk provides a progress report on a project to identify determinants and motives for why voters do (or do not) sell their votes. We use a large-scale survey with registered voters and with politicians in a rural border region of Kerala and Tamil Nadu to test for potential determinants of C4V. We also explore the causal effects of informational interventions (RCTs) to mitigate CFV which relate to strengthening civicness among voters and improving transparency about politician characteristics.
[Language]：English
[Application]：No advance registration is required. Please come directly to the Place.
日程[Date] ：2023年2月2日（金）[2(Fri.) Feb., 2024] 17:00-18:30
開催場所[Place]：7号館209号室 [Room 209 of Building 7 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)]
報告者[Speaker]：草川孝夫[Takao kusakawa] (高知工科大学[Kochi University of Technology])
講演タイトル[Title]： Informed Traders, Beauty Contest, and Stock Price Volatility:Evidence from Laboratory Markets
使用言語[Language]：英語[English]
申込方法[Application]：事前申し込みは不要です。直接開催場所までお越しください。
Summer Workshop on Economic Theory（SWET2023）
“Risk-return trade-offs in the context of environmental impact: an experiment with finance professionals and students”
(with Sébastien Duchêne, Adrien Nguyen Huu and Dimitri Dubois)
CEFM Workshop
Venue: 7-209 (Building #7) Waseda campus, Waseda University
Program
(1)
-Speaker：Elena molis(University of Granada)
-Title：“Is Acquitted or Convicted a social matter?
(2)
-Speaker：Maria Gomez Rua (University of Vigo)
-Title： "Stable and Weakly Additive Cost Sharing in Shortest Path Problems", with Juan Vidal Puga (University of Vigo) and Eric Bahel (Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University).
-Abstract ：In a shortest path problem, agents seek to ship their respective demands; and the cost on a given arc is linear in the flow. Rosenthal (2013) and Bahel and Trudeau (2014) have proposed cost allocations falling in the core of the associated cooperative game. The present work combines core selection with weak versions of the additivity axiom, which allows to characterize a new family of rules. The demander rule charges to each demander the cost of their shortest path; and the supplier rule charges the cost of the second-cheapest path while splitting the excess payment equally between access suppliers. Moreover, with three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity and two additional axioms that ensure the fair compensation of intermediaries. With three or more agents, the demander rule is characterized by core selection and a specific version of cost additivity. Finally, convex combinations of the demander rule and the supplier rule are axiomatized using core selection, a second version of cost additivity and two additional fairnesss properties.
Application：No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
CEFM Workshop
[Date&Time] ：12(Fri.) May, 2023 15:15-16:45
[Place]：Room 305 of Building 3 (Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.)
[Speaker]：Haimanti Bhattacharya（University of Utha)
[Title]： Bargaining in a marketplace with contractual breach: Evidence from field experiments(Authors Subhasish Dugar & Haimanti Bhattacharya)
[Language]：English
[Abstract] ：TBA
[Application]：No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
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CEFM Workshop
[Date] 15:15-16:45, 12 May 2023
[Venue] 3-305, Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.
[Speaker] Alberto Prati (UCL, University of Oxford, LSE)
[Title] A causal identification of wishful beliefs about COVID-19 vaccines(Authors: Alberto Prati (UCL, University of Oxford, LSE); Charlotte Saucet (Paris 1 University))
[Abstract]This study exploits a natural experiment which occurred in the United Kingdom during the COVID-19 vaccination campaign. UK residents could choose to opt into the vaccination program, but not which vaccine they received. We surveyed a sample of UK residents about their beliefs on the different COVID-19 vaccines before and after receiving their jab. We show that random assignment to a vaccine predicts a divergence of opinions about its safety and effectiveness. Before vaccination, individuals exhibit similar prior beliefs and wishes about the different vaccines. After vaccination, however, they update their beliefs optimistically about the safety and effectiveness of the vaccine they received, and state greater preference for the vaccine they actually received. At the individual level, our results provide a causal identification of wishful beliefs in a real-world health setting. At the aggregated level, our data show that belief divergence can occur even when similar people hold similar priors, are exposed to similar information environments, and have no room for the ex-post rationalization of previous decisions.
[Application]No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
[Date&Time] ：12(Fri.) May, 2023 15:15-16:45
[Date] 15:15-16:45, 12 May 2023
[Venue] 3-305, Waseda campus, Waseda Univ.
[Speaker] Alberto Prati (UCL, University of Oxford, LSE)
[Title] A causal identification of wishful beliefs about COVID-19 vaccines(Authors: Alberto Prati (UCL, University of Oxford, LSE); Charlotte Saucet (Paris 1 University))
CEFM Workshop for Nagasaki University
PJIR continuous workshop
co-Sponsored by CEFM
[Venue] 3-801 Waseda campus
[Date] 16:30-18:00 or 18:30 25th, 26th, 27th Jan. 2023
[Application] No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
[Program]
25th Jan.
16:30 Ricardo Martinez (Universidad de Granada), “Redistribution with Needs, “
17:30 Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Universidad Pablo de Olavide),
“The Costs and Benefits of Multilingualism,”
26th Jan.
16:30 Ryuichiro Ishikawa (Waseda University),
“A Resolution of the Centipede Paradox: Cognitive Bounds, Inertial Behavior, and Counter Factuality,”
17:30 Junnosuke Shino (Waseda University),
“Bank of Japan's ETF Purchase Program, Share Lending Market and Stock Returns,”
27th Jan.
16:30 Yaron Lahav (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev),
“Emotions and Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets,”
co-Sponsored by CEFM
[Venue] 3-801 Waseda campus
[Date] 16:30-18:00 or 18:30 25th, 26th, 27th Jan. 2023
[Application] No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
[Program]
25th Jan.
16:30 Ricardo Martinez (Universidad de Granada), “Redistribution with Needs, “
17:30 Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Universidad Pablo de Olavide),
“The Costs and Benefits of Multilingualism,”
26th Jan.
16:30 Ryuichiro Ishikawa (Waseda University),
“A Resolution of the Centipede Paradox: Cognitive Bounds, Inertial Behavior, and Counter Factuality,”
17:30 Junnosuke Shino (Waseda University),
“Bank of Japan's ETF Purchase Program, Share Lending Market and Stock Returns,”
27th Jan.
16:30 Yaron Lahav (Ben-Gurion University of the Negev),
“Emotions and Expectations in Experimental Asset Markets,”
CEFM Workshop
WINPEC workshop for Game theory and Experiments
Co-sponsored by core-to core and the Fund for the Promotion of Joint International Research
[Date]: 6 (Fri.) January 2023
[Time]: 12:４５-18:30
[Room] 3-704 of Building #3 (Waseda campus)
[Application] If you are interested in participating, please contact funaki@waseda.jp
[Program]
【Session 1】
12:45 Opening
12:50 Xiaohui Wang (Doctoral student, Waseda University) “not yet fixed”
13:00 Jingru Wang (Master student, Waseda University)
“Experimental analysis of IPO pricing mechanism: The case of Book-building”
13:20 Hideaki Minami (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“Experimental Analysis of Hedonic Games”
13:40 Daeseok Kim (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“Equilibrium analysis of the two-stage electoral competition model”
14:00 Hyoji Kwon (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“Fairness Ideal VS. Gender: The Effect of Empathy”
14:20 Ayano Nakagawa (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“On Multikeyword Sponsored Search Auctions: Equilibria, Revenue and Welfare”
14:40 Xin Fang (Doctor student, Waseda University)
“Learing and beauty-contest effect in stock trading experiments-designs and results”
15:00 break
【Session 2】
15:15 Mashbat Suzuki (University of New South Wales)
“Introduction to discrete fair division”
15:45 Liping Tang (Waseda University)
“Language politeness in social network”
16:15 break
【Session 3】
16:30 Yuki Takahashi (European University Institute)
“Gender Differences in the Cost of Corrections in Group Work”
17:30 David Lowing (Kyushu University)
“Sharing values for multi-choice games: an axiomatic approach”
18:30 closing
CEFM Workshop
[Date] ：9(Fri.) December, 2022 16：30－18：00
[Place]： Room 704 of Building 3, Waseda University (Waseda campus)
[Speaker]：Jonathan Yeo Xiong Wei（Nanyang Technological University Singapore）
[Title]： Ingroup Bias with Multiple Identities: The Case of Attitudes towards Religion and Government
[Language]：English
[Abstract] ：Group identity is known to exert a powerful socio-psychological influence on behaviour but to date has been largely explored as a uni-dimensional phenomenon. In an experiment, we consider the role of creating broader attention to multiple orthogonal dimensions of identity, asking whether it may help alleviate ingroup biases. We first induce identity categories in participants in either one or two politically charged identity dimensions documented to be of similar strength and largely orthogonal (religious belief and views about government size). Subsequently, we measure ingroup bias on each separate dimension (without revealing the other dimension) by using third party allocation tasks. We find that creating broader attention to another dimension of identity has a noticeable effect on behaviour in the revealed dimension --- albeit not in the direction expected. Broader attention can generate a significant increase in ingroup allocations at the expense of fairness to outgroup individuals, although the effect varies depending on whether religion or government size is the dimension which is revealed. Evidence suggests that the heterogeneity of such effects is related to the degree of ``harmony'' between groups in the dimensions concerned.
[Date] ：9(Fri.) December, 2022 16：30－18：00
[Place]： Room 704 of Building 3, Waseda University (Waseda campus)
[Speaker]：Jonathan Yeo Xiong Wei（Nanyang Technological University Singapore）
[Title]： Ingroup Bias with Multiple Identities: The Case of Attitudes towards Religion and Government
[Language]：English
[Abstract] ：Group identity is known to exert a powerful socio-psychological influence on behaviour but to date has been largely explored as a uni-dimensional phenomenon. In an experiment, we consider the role of creating broader attention to multiple orthogonal dimensions of identity, asking whether it may help alleviate ingroup biases. We first induce identity categories in participants in either one or two politically charged identity dimensions documented to be of similar strength and largely orthogonal (religious belief and views about government size). Subsequently, we measure ingroup bias on each separate dimension (without revealing the other dimension) by using third party allocation tasks. We find that creating broader attention to another dimension of identity has a noticeable effect on behaviour in the revealed dimension --- albeit not in the direction expected. Broader attention can generate a significant increase in ingroup allocations at the expense of fairness to outgroup individuals, although the effect varies depending on whether religion or government size is the dimension which is revealed. Evidence suggests that the heterogeneity of such effects is related to the degree of ``harmony'' between groups in the dimensions concerned.
[Application]：No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
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6th SPAIN-JAPAN MEETING ON ECONOMIC THEORY
［Date］October 24 and 25, 2022 17:00-20:30
［Place］Online（zoom)
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International Workshop on Experimental Macroeconomics and Finance
[Date] Saturday, October 8th, 2022. 9:30-17:00
[Place] Room 301, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
[Registration and details]
(Web page of Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/collabo/event_20221008.html
[Program]
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[Date] Saturday, October 8th, 2022. 9:30-17:00
[Place] Room 301, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
[Registration and details]
(Web page of Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University)
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/collabo/event_20221008.html
[Program]
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Special Lecture on Experimental Macroeconomics and Finance by John Duffy
[Date] Friday, September 30th and Friday, October 7th. 16:30-18:00
[Place] Online, zoom
[Speaker] John Duffy(University of California Irvine)
[Title] Experimental Macroeconomics and Finance
[Registration and details]
Web page of Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University
https://www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/collabo/event_20220930.html
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Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics
[Date] 11(Sun), 12(Mon) Sep.10：00－17：00
[Place] Mita Campus, Keio University (2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo, Japan) and Online
[Program]
The Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics 2022 program
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CEFM Workshop
[Date] 5 (Fri.) Aug. 16：30－18：00
[Place] Waseda University Building3 Room909
[Speaker] Di Feng (University of Lausanne)
[Title] "Top trading cycles based mechanisms for multiple-type housing markets"
[Language] English
[Abstract] 1) Characterizing the Coordinatewise Top-Trading-Cycles Mechanism for Multiple-Type Housing Markets, with Bettina Klaus and Flip Klijn
We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model of trading indivisible objects (houses) (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the coordinatewise top-trading-cycles (cTTC) mechanism.
We first show that on the subdomain of lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy-proof, and non-bossy if and only if it is the cTTC mechanism (Theorem 1). Second, using Theorem 1, we obtain a corresponding characterization on the domain of separable preferences (Theorem 2). We obtain corresponding results when replacing [strategy-proofness and non-bossiness] with effective group (or pairwise) strategy-proofness (Corollaries 1 and 2). Finally, we show that on the domain of strict preferences, there is no mechanism satisfying unanimity, individual rationality, and strategy-proofness (Theorem 3). Our characterizations of the cTTC mechanism constitute the first characterizations of an extension of the prominent top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism to multiple-type housing markets.
2) Endowments-swapping-proofness in Multiple-Type Housing Markets
For Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974), Fujinaka and Wakayama (2018) propose a new incentive property, endowments-swapping-proofness, that excludes manipulations that a pair of agents can conduct before the operation of the selected mechanism by swapping their endowments. We investigate endowments-swapping-proofness for Moulin (1995)’s multiple-type housing markets, which are an extension of Shapley-Scarf housing markets with multi-unit demand. Different to Shapley-Scarf housing markets, for multiple-type housing markets, there are various ways to swap endowments. Motivated by this observation, we introduce three extensions of endowments-swapping-proofness: bundle endowments-swapping-proofness, one type endowments-swapping-proofness, and flexible endowments-swapping-proofness.
Based on the first two weaker endowments-swapping-proofness properties that we proposed, and other well-studied properties (individual rationality, strategy-proofness, and non-bossiness), on several preferences domains we provide characterizations of two extensions of the top-trading-cycles (TTC) mechanism: the Bundle top-trading-cycles (bTTC) mechanism and the coordinate-wise top-trading-cycles (cTTC) mechanism. Moreover, we also show that the strongest possible endowments-swapping-proofness property (flexible endowments-swapping-proofness) leads to an impossibility.
Our characterization of the bTTC mechanism constitutes the first characterization of an extension of the prominent TTC mechanism to multiple-type housing markets with strict preferences.
CEFM Workshop
[Date] 22 (Fri.) July 10:40-12:10
[Place] Waseda University, 3-702
[Speaker] Noemí Navarro(University of Rennes 1 )
[Title] "Linguistic Convention and Language Segregation for the Basque Language"
[Language] English
[Abstract] This paper examines the links between proficiency, motivation, and use for the Basque minority language. We apply the model proposed
by Laruelle et al. (2019) and use data from the Sixth Sociolinguistic Survey on Basque (2019). We find that language segregation, i.e. the
fact that speakers meet with other speakers depending on their degree of motivation to use the minority language, plays a crucial role
in shaping the link between proficiency, motivation, and use.
[Date] 22 (Fri.) July 10:40-12:10
[Place] Waseda University, 3-702
[Speaker] Noemí Navarro(University of Rennes 1 )
[Title] "Linguistic Convention and Language Segregation for the Basque Language"
[Language] English
[Abstract] This paper examines the links between proficiency, motivation, and use for the Basque minority language. We apply the model proposed
by Laruelle et al. (2019) and use data from the Sixth Sociolinguistic Survey on Basque (2019). We find that language segregation, i.e. the
fact that speakers meet with other speakers depending on their degree of motivation to use the minority language, plays a crucial role
in shaping the link between proficiency, motivation, and use.
This seminar is open to everyone.No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
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CEFM Workshops
[Date]：15(Fri.) July, 2022 16：30－18：30
[Place]：Room 704 of Building 3 (Waseda campus)
[Language]：English
[Application]：No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
- Session1
[Speaker]：Wael Bousselmi（Ecole polytechnique）
[Title]： "How do markets react to (un)expected fundamental value shocks? An experimental analysis"
[Abstract]：We study experimentally the reaction of asset markets to fundamental value (FV) shocks. The pre-shock and post-shock FV are both constant, but after the shock the FV is either higher or lower than before. We compare treatments with expected shocks (the date and the magnitude are known in advance, but not the direction) to treatments with unexpected shocks (subjects only know that a shock may occur but are unaware of the date and the magnitude). We observe mispricing in markets without shocks and in markets with shocks. Shocks tend to reduce the post-shock price deviation and to increase the difference of opinions (DO), whatever the type of the shock (expected or unexpected) and its direction (upwards or downwards). In contrast to standard predictions, the larger DO after a shock is not accompanied by an increase in transaction volumes, but by sharp depression of share turnover.
- Session2
[Speaker]：Ali Ozkes（EMLV business school)[Title]："Polarization in Networks: Identification-alienation Framework" (joint work with Kenan Huremovic (IMT Lucca, Italy))
[Abstract]：We introduce a model of polarization in networks as a unifying setting for the measurement of polarization that covers a wide range of applications. We consider a substantially general setup for this purpose: node- and edge-weighted, undirected, and connected networks. We generalize the axiomatic characterization of Esteban and Ray (1994) and show that only a particular instance within this class can be used justifiably to measure polarization in networks.
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CEFM Workshops
[Date] ：8(Fri.) July, 2022 16：30－18：00
[Place]：Room 704 of Building 3 (Waseda campus)
[Speaker]：Matias Nunez(Ecole polytechnique）
[Title]： "Trimming extreme reports in preference aggregation"
[Language]：English
[Abstract] ：Eliminating –or trimming– extreme reports before aggregating them is usually motivated by the perception that it constitutes a remedy for strategic misreporting. This work focuses on the strategic calculus of voting when using trimmed-mean mechanisms for preference aggregation. Contrary to the above presumption, we show, both formally and experimentally that, under such mechanisms, voters persistently resort to strategic polarization for all but the most extreme levels of trimming. Furthermore, we show that while trimming promotes efficiency (i.e. the average payoff increases), it also leads to more inequality (i.e. the minimum payoff decreases). While experimental results provide some support for the idea that trimming can mitigate strategic misreporting, the extent of this non-equilibrium behavior is not enough to overturn the comparative static predictions in this setting.
[Application]：No advance registration is required.Please come directly to the Place.
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CEFM Workshop
[Date] 1 (Fri.) July 16：30－18：00
[Place] Waseda University, 3-704[Speaker] Alina Velias（the London School of Economics）[Title] The ignorance trap: who falls prey to expert-defying populism and why [Language] [English]
[Abstract] How do people choose expert advice? What personal traits determine the persuasiveness of expert versus populist advice? Populists, in our context, conform to commonly held beliefs, even when wrong. Do participants choose the high-accuracy adviser (‘the Expert’), or the low accuracy one (‘the Charlatan’), whose answers are designed to be similar to the modal participant’s? In this paper, building on previous work by Alysandratos, Boukouras, Georganas & Maniadis (2021), we develop and test on a representative sample of 12000 subjects, a simple task that captures the essence of the expertise detection problem, yet has a very tractable theoretical solution: if you (believe you) are knowledgeable in a topic, choose experts you agree with. If you are not knowledgeable, you are better served by experts that tell you what you did not think of yourself.
We find that high human capital subjects find it easier to apply the counterintuitive strategy than others. Simply put, to be able to persuade the median citizen and those lying lower in the cognitive distribution, experts face a double challenge: they have to lower the citizens’ disbelief regarding the expert’s advice and convince them that any lingering disbelief might be a good sign. Our findings provide a novel explanation why low-skilled citizens are susceptible to populism. It is not about preferences, incentives, or simple motivated reasoning. Some citizens simply cannot distinguish populist charlatans from true experts. While we have identified a mechanism that allows charlatans to win, and the target audience for this sort of populism, finding comprehensive solutions to overcome it is left for further research.
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Workshop by CEFM members
[Date] 24 (Fri.) June. 16：30－18：00
[Place] Waseda University, 3-704
[Speaker] Charles Noussair（The University of Arizona）
[Title] Don’t tell anyone I lost to a girl! Gender stereotypes and hiding low performance
[Language] English
[Abstract] Social scientists from several disciplines have asserted that men incur a psychological cost when they are outperformed by a female competitor. We conduct a laboratory experiment that allows us to measure this cost for performance in a mathematical task. The experiment is conducted in both the US and China.We find that in our Chinese sample, men are willing to pay more to hide the fact that they have performed worse than another individual than women are, while there is no gender difference in the US. In China, women are willing to pay more to hide poor performance when losing to another woman than to a man. In the US, the opposite pattern is observed; women have a greater cost of revealing that they have lost to a man than to another woman. The gender of the counterpart is not a determinant of men’s willingness to hide poor performance. An incentivized questionnaire reveals that a stereotype that men would outperform women exists in the Chinese sample, but not among our American participants.
Workshop by CEFM members
CEFM Online Workshops by zoom
[Date]Feb.28,2022（Mon.） Online by ZOOM
[Program]■(session 1) 13:30-14:30 Speaker Keiko Mizuno（Kansei Gakuin University） "Detrimental effect of sanction in public goodsgame context of remove the sanctionparadigm" Discussant Ai Takeuchi（Ritsumeikan University）
■(session2) 14:40-15:40 Speaker Michiko Ogaku（Nagasaki University） "The Incentive Effect of Full and Garbled Reporting: Theory and Experiment (joint with Yukihiko Funaki, Edward Halim and Yohanes E. Riyanto)" Discussant Shinsuke Kambe（Gakushuin University）
■(session3) 15:50-16:50 Speaker Taro Shinoda(Waseda University,graduate student） "Linguistic Analysis of Three-person Unstructured Bargaining Experiment" Discussant Yoshio Kamijo（Waseda University）
■(session4) 17:00-18:00 Speaker Tomohito AOYAMA(Hitotsubashi University) "Experimental Evaluation of Random Incentive System Under Ambiguity" Discussant Aurelien Baillon(Erasmus University Rotterdam)
[Language]Japanese(session1,2)、English
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Global climate cooperation without sanctions
The negative result on the level of cooperation in the literature of international environmental agreements is caused by the static nature of a two-stage participation game. We present a dynamic coalition formation game where coalitions are irreversible, and countries negotiate transfer schemes to attract non-participants. We show that if countries are sufficiently patient, then there exists a Markov perfect equilibrium where the grand coalition forms immediately. We further show that if countries are impatient, the grand coalition gradually forms in finitely many rounds for every Markov perfect equilibrium under a super-additivity condition. The results hold for any transfer scheme satisfying individual rationality and coalitional efficiency.
Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory
[Date] October 20(Wed.), 21(Thu.) , 2021
[Program] ※ST： Spanish time、 JT： Japanese time■Session１ October 20(Wed.) 10:00-11:30 (ST), 17:00-18:30 (JT)〈Chair : Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University)〉●10:00-10:30 (ST)、17:00-17:30(JT) Title: Comparative statics of Bargaining Solution: Equality and insensitivity biases by mis-specifying utility function Speaker: Yoshio Kamijo (Waseda University)●10:30-11:00 (ST)、 17:30-18:00 (JT) Title: Social solidarity with dummies in TU games Speaker: Ricardo Mart´ınez (Universidad de Granada)●11:00-11:30 (ST)、 18:00-18:30 (JT) Title: Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Tie-Breaker-Augmented ObjectAllocation Problem with Discrete Payments Speaker: Ryosuke Sakai (Osaka University)
■Session 2 October 20(Wed.) 12:00-13:30 (ST), 19:00-20:30 (JT).〈Chair: Elena Molis (Universidad de Granada)〉●12:00-12:30 (ST), 19:00-19:30 (JT) Title: Efficient and Strategy-Proof Multi-Unit Object Allocation with Money: (Non)decreasing Marginal Valuations without Quasi-Linearity Speaker: Hiroki Shonozaki (Osaka University)●12:30-13:00 (ST), 19:30-20:00 (JT) Title: Dynamic housing market Speaker: Pietro Salmaso (Universidad de Malaga) ●13:00-13:30 (ST), 20:00-20:30 (JT) Title: An Informational Theory of Alliances Speaker: Raghul Venkatesh (Universidad de Malaga)
■Session 3. October, 21(Thu.), 10:00-11:30 (ST), 17:00-18:30 (JT).Chair: Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda University)●10:00-10:30 (ST), 17:00-17:30 (JT) Title: (The impossibility of) Deliberation-Consistent Social Choice Speaker: Tshuyosi Adachi (Waseda University)●10:30-11:00 (ST), 17:30-18:00 (JT) Title: Optimal management of evolving hierarchies Speaker: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Universidad Pablo de Olavide)●11:00-11:30 (ST), 18:00-18:30 (JT) Title: On the empirical validity of axioms in unstructured bargaining Speaker: Robert Veszteg (Waseda University)
■Session 4 October, 21(Thu.), 12:00-13:30 (ST), 19:00-20:30 (JT)〈Chair: Bernardo Moreno (Universidad de Malaga) 〉●12:00-12:30 (ST), 19:00-19:30 (JT) Title: A Characterization of the Minimum Price Walrasian Rule with Reserve Prices Speaker: Yuya Wakabayashi (Osaka University)●12:30-13:00 (ST), 19:30-20:00 (JT) Title: Is small always beautiful? Speaker: Francisco Alvarez (Universidad Complutense de Madrid)●13:00-13:30 (ST), 20:00-20:30 (JT) Title: Uncovering Seeds Speaker: Marc Vorsatz (UNED)
[Sponsors]This meeting is supported by these sponsors.• JSPS Core-to-Core Program (JPJSCCA20200001)• JSPS KAKENHI Grants (20H05631, 17H02503)• Joint Usage/Research Center at ISER, Osaka University• Osaka University’s International Joint Research Promotion Program (Type A)• Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovacion (PID2020-114309GB-I00; PID2020-115011GB-I00)• Junta de Andaluc´ıa (P18-FR-2933)
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Summer Workshop on Game Theory and Experimental Economics 2021
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We held a zoom Game Theory seminar as follows.
[Date] 28 (Fri.) May, 2021 16：40－18：00
[Speaker] Yukio Koriyama （École polytechnique）
[Title] The Winner-Take-All Dilemma: Theory and Experiments
[Language] English
Abstract:
We consider a preference aggregation problem in which the society is partitioned into different groups and each group decides the internal rule by which the members’ preferences are aggregated. Kikuchi and Koriyama (2021) characterized the winner-take-all rule by strategic dominance while the Pareto set is fully given by the generalized proportional profiles, implying that the game is an n-player prisoner’s dilemma. However, Pareto dominance by the purely proportional profile is proven only asymptotically and there are counterexamples either for a small number of groups, with internal heterogeneity, or with costly voting. In this project, we provide welfare analysis by considering conditions under which the Pareto dominance is violated. Using our theoretical and experimental analysis, we provide insights on the condition under which the oft-claimed statements hold, such as “the winner-take-all protects small states” or “the winner-take-all protects minority.”
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2 Days Game Theory workshop 2021
(1) 26(Fri.) Feb, 2021 16：30－18：00
[Title] Stability properties of the core in a generalized assignment problem (joint with Ryo Kawasaki)
[Abstract] We show that the core of a generalized assignment problem satisfies two types of stability properties. First, the core is the unique stable set defined using the weak domination relation when outcomes are restricted to individually rational and pairwise feasible ones. Second, the core is the unique stable set with respect to a sequential domination relation that is defined by a sequence of weak domination relations that satisfy outsider independence. An equivalent way of stating this result is that the core satisfies the property commonly stated as the existence of a path to stability. These results add to the importance of the core in an assignment problem where agents' preferences may not be quasilinear.
[Language] Japanese
(2) 5(Fri.) March
17：00－18：00
[Title] Sharing the Surplus and Proportional Values.
[Abstract] We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between his stand-alone worth and the average stand-alone worths over all players, and then allocates the remaining worth among the players in proportion to their stand-alone worths. This family contains the proportional division value and the new egalitarian proportional surplus division value as two special cases. We provide characterizations for this family of values, as well as for each single value in this family.
[Language] English
18：00－19：00
[Title] Valuation Monotonicity, Fairness and Stability in Assignment Problems
(joint work with Marina Nunez and Francisco Robles
[Abstract] In two-sided assignment markets with transferable utility, we first introduce two weak monotonicity properties that are compatible with stability. We show that for a fixed population, the sellers-optimal (respectively the buyers-optimal) stable rules are the only stable rules that satisfy object-valuation antimonotonicity (respectively buyer-valuation monotonicity). Essential in these
[Language] English
19:00-19:30 Discussions
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The 4th Spain-Japan Meeting on Economic Theory (Oct. 19,23, 2020)
【Organizers】: Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda Univesity), Ricardo Martinez (Universidad de Granada), Bernardo Moreno Jiménez (Universidad de Málaga), Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Univeridad Pablo de Olavide), Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University)
Part I (October 19)
Session 1. Chair: Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University)
08.00-09.30 (Spanish time); 15.00-16.30 (Japanese time)
1) Junichiro Ishida (Osaka University) “Signaling under Double-Crossing Preferences” (co-authored with Chia-Hui Chen and Wing Suen)
2) Noriaki Matsushima (Osaka University) “Data-Driven Mergers and Personalization” (co-authored with Zhijun Chen, Chongwoo Choe, and Jiajia Cong)
3) Kohei Kawamura (Waseda Univesity) “Efficient Equilibrium in Common Interest Voting Games”
Session 2. Chair: Ricardo Martinez (Universidad de Granada)
10.00-11.30 (Spanish time); 17.00-18.30 (Japanese time)
4) Bernardo Moreno Jiménez (Universidad de Málaga) “Pairwise Justifiable Changes in Collective Choices”
5) Gustavo Bergantiños (Universidade de Vigo) “On the Axiomatic Approach to Sharing the Revenues from Broadcasting Sports Leagues”
6) Pablo Amorós (Universidad de Málaga) “Selecting Winners by Possibly Biased Committees”
Part II (October 23)
Session 3. Chair: Yukihiko Funaki (Waseda Univesity)
08.00-09.30 (Spanish time); 15.00-16.30 (Japanese time)
7) Yoshio Kamijo (Waseda University) “Group Size Paradox Revisited in Group Contest: Theory and Experiment”
8) Patrick Dejarnette (Waseda University) “Failure of Bayesian Updating and the Echo Chamber Effect” (co-authored with Chun-Hou Cheng and Joseph Tao-yi Wang)
9) Ryosuke Sakai (Osaka University) “Efficiency and Strategy-Proofness in Tie-Breaker-Augmented Object Allocation Problem with Discrete Payments” (co-authored with Shigehiro Serizawa)
Session 4. Chair: Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Univeridad Pablo de Olavide)
10.00-11.30 (Spanish time); 17.00-18.30 (Japanese time)
10) Ricardo Martínez (Universidad de Granada) “A Generalized Domain for the Museum Pass Problem”
11) Jorge Alcalde-Unzu (Universidad Pública de Navarra) “Strategy-Proofness in a Domain with Single-Peaked and Single-Dipped Preferences”
12) Juan D. Moreno-Ternero (Univeridad Pablo de Olavide) “Fair International Protocols for the Abatement of GHG Emissions”
*Please contact to CEFMproject@gmail.com if you like to participate this meeting.
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CEFM Kickoff zoom Workshop
14:45-15:30 Xin Fang (Waseda University) Beauty-contest effect in stock-price-prediction experiments
15:30-16:15 Yuji Kawamata (Universityof Tsukuba) Effects of Dynamic Equilibria for Keyword Auction on Expected Revenue of Search Engine
16:30-17:30 Kenju Kamei (University of Durham) Free Riding and Workplace Democracy–Heterogeneous Task Preferences and Sorting
17:30-18:00 Discusion
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CFEM Online workshop for Young researchers
For more details, please refer to this link.
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Please contact CEFMproject@gmail.com for the details about seminars and workshops.
*All the seminars and workshops above are under the auspices of Core-to-Core Program by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS).
